EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SUMMARY

This issue of Constellis’ Kidnap for Ransom Insight Report covers global kidnapping incidents and trends for the months of May, June and July 2020. The information is derived from multi-source analysis of kidnap for ransom activity and where known, the outcome or resolution of the events. The report covers current kidnap for ransom hotspots at regional, national and provincial levels, with a particular focus on areas where kidnap for ransom activity is increasing.

Statistical analysis of data for May and June 2020 is included on page 13, which displays kidnap for ransom trends by region, victims by nationality and employment sector, as well as identifying the Top 10 countries for the kidnapping of foreign nationals over the reporting period. Additionally, 12-month statistical information (July 2019 – June 2020) can be found on page 17.

The Global Piracy Update gives an overview of the piracy threat by region, providing trend analysis for May and June 2020. It also offers sample cases that took place during those months to illustrate identified trends.

The Cybersecurity section examines current issues affecting companies and individuals in the realm of IT security. This edition will provide an insight into the threat of Chinese cyberattacks in the context of the geopolitical tensions surrounding the eastern giant. While several countries are attempting to bolster their defences, a number of cyberattacks traced to China have already occurred, including attacks against governments, businesses and critical infrastructure. With relations not showing any signs of improvement, no let-up in malicious Chinese cyber activity is anticipated in the near future.

The Focus Article examines stabilisation in the Horn of Africa. Somali piracy has stabilised, reaching record lows in activity, as a result of international naval efforts, piracy countermeasures on board ships, and a relative improvement in governance and security conditions in Somalia. However, the country is on the constant edge of crisis due to a series of significant challenges, including terrorism, drought, natural disasters, and poor governance. The next six months, characterised by upcoming important economic opportunities and general elections, among other important changes, may determine the nation’s future. This article is aimed at exploring Somalia’s path to stability and its prospects for future development in the second half of 2020.
Over May-June 2020, a consistent level of kidnapping of foreign nationals was observed in the Americas when compared with the previous reporting period. This low incidence continues to be attributed to the ongoing movement and travel restrictions across the region related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although measures have begun to be eased, the inflow of foreign nationals remains low as many countries continue to struggle with containing the pandemic. In Mexico, it is unclear whether general kidnapping levels have changed due to the coronavirus situation or just as a result of increased underreporting. However, it is clear that cartel violence has increased in recent months, as these groups exploit the security void caused by the pandemic to intensify their turf wars. This has been evidenced by an exponential increase in murder rates since March, some of the highest since 2008. At present, it is estimated that at least 40% of Mexico’s territory suffers from chronic insecurity, and while this has not yet resulted in Mexico being considered a failed state, it is certainly having grave repercussions outside the security sphere, particularly in the economy. Likewise, in Colombia, as the authorities focus on enforcing COVID-19 measures, particularly in urban centres, cartel and militant violence has soared in rural areas. An increase in criminal activity linked to these groups has been particularly noticeable on the border with Venezuela, a largely ungoverned space. There, fighting among groups has recently intensified, along with other activities such as kidnapping and extortion. Entrepreneurs in the agribusiness sector continue to be the main targets of organised crime and militancy in rural areas, as well as oil workers and members of the security forces. Nonetheless, foreign nationals will also remain attractive targets for Colombian armed groups.

**CASES:**

- **On 28 June,** an Argentinean and a Chilean national were found dead inside two suitcases in a desolate area of the port city of Mazatlán, Sinaloa state. The pair reportedly arrived in the city on 20 June to promote cryptocurrency investment schemes. According to police reports, they were abducted on the same day that their bodies were found. The reason behind their kidnapping and murder is still unknown. Mexican media did not offer further details; however, the Chilean press reported that the Sinaloa Cartel was involved in the incident. While ransom cannot be discarded as a motive, it is also possible that the men were abducted and killed due to fraud committed by the victims, as their company is linked to a number of criminal reports for fraud in Argentina.

- **On 18 June,** Swiss national Daniel Max Guggenheim and Brazilian José Ivan Albuquerque were rescued from a rural property in Cauca department during a military operation, which also resulted in the arrest of one suspect. The two men had reportedly been held by the Dagoberto Ramos Mobile Column of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) since mid-March. The victims said they were kidnapped from a restaurant in the town of Corinto, while on their way back to Bogota after visiting the Pacific coast as tourists. The kidnappers moved them several times during their captivity. A ransom equivalent to USD 266,000 was reportedly demanded from their families, which later decreased to USD 1,300. The victims did not specify whether any money was paid.

A worsening security situation is being observed in many regions of Paraguay, particularly in areas close to the border with Brazil, where violent crime has seen an increase over recent months, especially kidnap for ransom. Similar to Colombia, agricultural business men have been the prime targets of these events. Many victims have been Brazilian nationals, who are considered wealthier than their local peers. In what seems to be a politically-motivated strategy, the Paraguayan authorities have attributed the latest violence to the country’s main militant organisation, the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP). Although the group remains a threat, evidence from recent incidents point towards different authors. This includes the fact that the EPP’s presence in many of these areas is limited and that none of these events has been claimed by the group. On the other hand, an increasing presence of Brazilian organised criminal groups along the border has been reported since 2019, with many of them making significant inroads into Paraguayan territory, establishing permanent operational centres and creating alliances with local groups. Among them are the big Brazilian criminal players such as the First Capital Command (PCC) and the Comando Vermelho (CV), as well as other smaller groups such as Primeiro Grupo Catarinense (PGC). This not only means that Paraguay is increasingly becoming a setting for Brazilian organised crime, but also for their feuds. Moreover, the possibility that other local militant groups may be surfacing in the area has not been discarded, given that the long-lasting conflict between ranchers and less-privileged local groups, especially indigenous communities, is far from being resolved.

**CASES:**

- **On 13 June,** a group of armed men raided a ranch in the Paraguayan municipality of Tavai, Caazapa department, taking a number of hostages, including the manager. The criminals said they were after the owner, but since he was not present at the time, they waited for him. Upon his arrival, Carlo Tamiozzo was attacked and subdued by the criminals who demanded a payment of USD 50,000 on the spot. The rancher denied having such an amount but asked the men to let him go to collect it. The assailants refused and instead took him and the manager away. The manager was later released a few kilometres away from the ranch. Tamiozzo’s family immediately reported the incident to the authorities, who believe the abduction may be for other motives, as the rancher is not particularly wealthy. Tamiozzo managed to escape on 23 July.

- **In Brazil,** a recurrent criminal activity is ‘Tiger’ kidnapping, locally known as ‘sapatinho’. This involves taking hostages with access to valuables to force them to commit a robbery or another crime. For instance, on 19 May, the manager of a bank in Guaxupé, Minas Gerais, was taken hostage by a group of armed criminals outside a bar. The man was then taken to his home, where his wife and two children were also taken hostage. Part of the gang took the manager to the bank, while the rest remained at the residence with the other hostages. While at the bank, bank employees noticed suspicious activity in the offices and called the police. Immediately after the arrival of the police, one of the criminals shot the victim in the head. As they fled the building, the criminals exchanged fire with police officers, with one gang member sustaining injuries and later dying in hospital. The remaining hostages were later released by the criminals near the location where the manager was taken. Investigations continue to identify the other suspects.
Europe

Europe remained at a significantly low level of kidnap incidents involving foreign Nationals, with only two events recorded over the reporting period. A number of incidents involving local nationals were reported over May and July, as well as related arrests. One ongoing trend in the region is the abduction of migrants. Though at much lower numbers compared to those observed in pre-coronavirus times, these events continued to be reported despite the closure of borders and increasing anti-migrant sentiment. This phenomenon is expected to intensify in the coming months as more people experience hardship in their countries of origin due to the COVID-19 economic crisis and as travel restrictions have started to ease. Moreover, recent reports suggest that Turkish authorities have begun to ferry migrants to the Greek islands. Likewise, incidents related to Europe’s criminal underworld remain a feature of the region’s kidnap’s, even during the pandemic. Debts, financial disputes and group rivalries remain the most common motivations in these instances. Such kidnapping events however are targeted, and thus unlikely to affect unsuspecting travellers or expatriates.

**CASES:**

- On 28 June, two Pakistanis were arrested by Greek police for the kidnapping of a compatriot. The arrest followed a report made by the alleged victim the previous day. The foreign migrant said he had been abducted by his compatriots and held in a house in the locality of Volvi, Thessaloniki. The perpetrators reportedly threatened to kill him if his family did not pay a ransom. An undisclosed amount was subsequently paid, resulting in his release. Thessaloniki, particularly Volvi, is no stranger to such events, with a number of similar cases reported in the past. Common victims are South Asian migrants who are smuggled from Turkey by gangs with links to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

- On 1 June, Belgian authorities announced the release of a teenage member of a well-known family of Kurdish drug traffickers, after 42 days in captivity. At least seven people involved in the abduction were arrested in a series of raids in Antwerp and Limburg following the release of the minor. A source close to the investigation said the kidnap was linked to developments in the drugs scene. However, the leader of the gang was a convicted terrorist and leader of the gang that kidnapped a teenager for ransom in the Belgian city of Genk. The kidnappers reportedly demanded a ransom of EUR 5 million. According to the media, the incident was not immediately reported by the boy’s family, and given their notoriety with the Belgian police, they initially opted to negotiate directly with the kidnappers. A final sum of EUR 330,000 was allegedly paid in exchange for the victim’s release.

While not as common as it was two decades ago, ‘Tiger’ kidnappings are occasionally recorded in various countries across Europe. The first recorded Tiger kidnapping took place in the early 1970s, though the practice became widespread during the 1980s. The tactic was particularly prolific amongst crime syndicates in Ireland and the UK, and was later adopted by gangs in other countries in continental Europe, such as Belgium. Small businesses with limited security are at particular risk of being targeted. However, the risk can be reduced by maintaining simple security measures, such as requiring that two or more people work together in secure areas, ensuring that more than one person is required to gain access to company valuables, and no admittance to secure areas outside working hours.

**CASES:**

- On 25 May, the manager of a Leclerc Hypermarket in Castres, France, was taken hostage by three armed men who invaded her home at night. She was then forced to drive the criminals to the hypermarket in her own car. Once there, she was instructed to deactivate the CCTV cameras and the alarm, and to hand over the contents of the safe, estimated at around EUR 40,000. To avoid leaving any trace, the criminals burnt the woman’s car after having left her tied up inside her office.

In Ukraine, like many other former Soviet republics, organised crime remains one of the main security concerns. Criminal groups have been responsible for acts of violence in various Ukrainian cities in the past. While such incidents are localised in nature, there is a collateral risk for bystanders. The Ukrainian security profile is also shaped by the conflict with Russia over Crimea. Beside the risk directly emanating from the armed conflict, separatists maintain checkpoints throughout this region and have detained or kidnapped individuals, including foreign nationals, on several occasions. A number of politically-motivated abductions linked to the conflict have also been reported elsewhere in the country, carried out by pro-Russian elements or in some instances, by suspected Russian agents.

**CASES:**

- On 1 July, businessman Sergei Tkachenko was abducted by unidentified armed men in Kiev, Ukraine. The kidnap was reported on social media by his wife, who witnessed the incident. Yulianna Tkachenko said her husband was stabbed and then taken away in broad daylight from inside one of their businesses in the city. The family suspected the involvement of the Russian Special Services, given that Tkachenko is a shareholder of a plant in Yuzhny, in annexed Crimea. According to Yulianna Tkachenko, the Russians had tried to take over the plant but the company owners had appealed the decision. She also said they had been receiving threats over past months, including a message in which they were notified that Sergei had been arrested in absentia by the Tver court of the Russian Federation and put on the federal wanted list. Tkachenko was rescued by police on 15 July from a basement in the Goloseevsky district of Kiev, where he was held and tortured for two weeks. Three kidnappers were arrested during the raid. Ukrainian authorities confirmed that a ransom had been demanded in exchange for the businessman’s freedom, leaving any Russian link to the case unconfirmed.

Businessman Sergei Tkachenko was found by Ukrainian police handcuffed to a radiator inside the basement of a property in the Goloseevsky district of Kiev. (Photo: kyivoperativ.info)
In Iraq, tensions have continued to escalate between pro-Iranian militias on one side, and the governments of Iraq and the US on the other, as Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi attempts to assert his power and bring the Popular Mobilisation Units (PMUs) under greater state control. These attempts have resulted in him being labelled a US puppet, exacerbating anti-US sentiment among these groups and prompting a more belligerent stance. Most notable among the measures taken by the al-Kadhimi regime against Iran-backed PMU’s was the raid against the Kata’ib Hezbollah headquarters in Baghdad on 28 June. This incident provoked a series of attacks targeting high-profile locations in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, particularly those linked to US interests, with such attacks continuing to be reported on a regular basis. While not new, an escalation in this type of activity has been evident, and for the first time, these militia groups have openly threatened and acknowledged the targeting of US bases, personnel and interests. Though most recent incidents have mainly involved rocket attacks, other tactics used by PMU groups include harassment, kidnappings and targeted killings. This mostly affects local nationals; however, a number of foreign nationals have been targeted in the past.

CASES:

- German arts educator and curator Hella Mewis was kidnapped by unknown gunmen in Baghdad on 20 July. Mewis, who is the head of the culture department of the German Goethe Institut in Baghdad, was abducted in the evening near her office located in the Abu Nuwas neighbourhood. Local media, citing eyewitnesses, reported that the expatriate worker was riding her bicycle along the Corniche of the Tigris River when she was accosted by two cars, one of them a pickup truck like those used by the security forces. It was also reported that police in a car parked in front Mewis’ place of work witnessed the abduction and yet did not intervene. No group has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping. It is believed that Mewis could have been kidnapped as a result of her activism, which included her participation and online documentation of the anti-government protests that have swept Baghdad since October 2019, all of which led to her being labelled as a foreign “spy” by online detractors. Mewis was allegedly freed by Iraqi security forces on 24 July. The perpetrators have not been identified.

- While crime rates in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states remain low, kidnapp for ransom occasionally takes place, particularly among South Asian expatriate communities. For instance, on 8 July, a Bangladeshi expatriate worker was kidnapped in Riyadh by an international kidnapping ring based in Saudi Arabia but mainly comprising Bangladeshi nationals. The kidnappers demanded a ransom of BDT 500,000 (approximately USD 6,000) from the man’s family and threatened to kill him if this was not paid. The worker was reportedly kept hostage in a small, dark room, and was tortured by the group, including during video calls with his wife and brother, who live in Bangladesh. The family reportedly paid BDT 102,000 (over USD 1,000) on the same day. However, the victim was not released, leading the family to report the incident to the police in Bangladesh. Saudi police rescued the man the next day, also arresting four suspects. An additional suspect was subsequently arrested in Dhaka. Bangladeshi authorities continue investigations to identify other Bangladeshi members of the gang.

Incident levels in the Middle East remained consistent with the previous reporting period, with 27 foreign nationals kidnapped in May and June. Most of the victims recorded were part of a mass abduction of migrants in Lebanon. The Syrian conflict has created one of the worst humanitarian crises of our time, with more than 12.7 million people forced to flee their homes since the war started in 2011. As families continue struggling to survive inside Syria, migration flows endure, despite the high risks. These include kidnapping for ransom, often by the same people who are supposed to assist them in reaching their ultimate destination. Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley is a common location for these activities, given its proximity to the Syrian border and its long-standing kidnapping and smuggling industry. Syria remains one of the top five recipients of humanitarian aid in the world. Unfortunately, by the same token, the country is among the deadliest places for aid workers, who are not only collateral victims in the war but are also a target for the different warring parties. While aerial bombardment remains the primary means of attack affecting aid workers in Syria, kidnapping and detention are ever-present threats, particularly for foreign workers and those working for foreign aid organisations.

CASES:

- On 14 June, the Lebanese army announced the rescue of 23 Syrian migrants who had been held hostage in Brital, in the Bekaa Valley. The rescue operation was initiated after the authorities received reports from local citizens that an armed group had abducted a number of people for ransom. The released hostages, among whom were a number of women and children, had been detained for 15 days. During the operation, one of the kidnappers, a Syrian national, was fatally injured, while another, a Lebanese man, was arrested.

- Tauqir Sharif, a British aid worker known for having lost his UK citizenship due to being suspected of supporting terror groups in Syria, was detained on the evening of 22 June. The arrest was carried out by approximately 15 members of Islamist militant group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), who raided his home in the locality of Atmeh, Idlib province. The aid worker was released “on bail” on 15 July, after spending more than three weeks in detention. HTS stated that bail had been granted following a request by his family. However, Sharif was still due to appear in court in 15 days, accused of “mismanagement of humanitarian funds and its use towards projects that sow sedition and division.” According to Sharif’s supporters, the allegations are unsubstantiated and appear to be in fact related to his refusal to transfer aid funds to HTS. Additionally, it was reported that Sharif’s arrest took place amid a suspected HTS purge of prominent individuals who were thought to oppose its rule in the region, or simply to have lost favour with the group.

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AFRICA

Over May and June 2020, Africa observed an increase of 30% in the number of kidnapped foreign nationals, compared to the previous two-month period. Once again, this increase was due to a surge in pirate activity in the Gulf of Guinea, where attacks are becoming more frequent and larger groups are being kidnapped. The aid sector is also among the most affected by violence in the region. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), at least 566 aid workers were attacked in West and Central Africa between 2010 and 2019, out of whom 36% were victims of kidnapping. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR) and Nigeria accounted for 76% of these victims. While Cameroon is low on the list with only 12 victims in that period, the security situation has worsened over the past year, with humanitarian workers increasingly targeted. Aid workers there have been victims of murder, abduction, harassment, extortion, and other abuses, as supplies and property have been looted and destroyed, both by militants and government forces. These events have notably hindered humanitarian activities in the country, ultimately worsening the crisis.

CASES:

- A local community health worker with International NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was kidnapped and murdered in Cameroon’s South-West region. According to MSF, the health worker was kidnapped by armed men on 9 July, while he was working in the locality of Kumba. The following day, the perpetrators reported the victim’s death to MSF. A video of the assassination was published on 11 July on social networks. The video also showed the perpetrators proclaiming their membership of the Ambazonian military. One aid official said that the Anglophone separatists killed the aid worker on suspicion of his being a government spy. Meanwhile, the leadership of the Ambazonian separatist movement headed by Samuel Sako condemned the murder and were later treated in a hospital in Mizda. Libya’s internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) said it had issued arrest warrants for the perpetrators, though the area is allegedly controlled by international mercenaries, further protracting the war. The security vacuum has been a fertile ground for a myriad of hostile actors, including well-organised criminal gangs, which operate virtually unimpeded or at times in concert with local forces. Despite the poor security situation in the country, Libya continues to be a receptor of foreign illegal migration, due to the existing job opportunities in the oil sector, as well as being an exit point towards Europe. According to NGO Doctors for Human Rights (MEDU), around 85% of migrants and refugees are subjected to torture and other violence in Libya, with two-thirds reporting having been detained against their will, either for ransom or forced labour. Kidnappers use extreme tactics to make sure the ransom money is paid, including sending torture videos to victims’ families via social media. Generally, ransom amounts seem to range between USD 2,000 and 3,000, but sums as high as USD 60,000 have also been recorded. According to some studies, Eritreans, Somalis and Ethiopians are the most common victims, though it is unclear whether they are being specifically targeted due to their nationality or as a result of the route they follow. Having said that, it is believed they may be considered more attractive targets for kidnapping gangs, given their large diaspora in developed countries and their strong sense of community, which translates into larger and better mobilisation of funds.

- An MSF aid worker was released after being held hostage for 18 days in eastern DRC. In a statement on 17 July, the INGO said the victim, whose nationality was not specified, had been held by an “unidentified armed group” who abducted him in Lulumba, South Kivu, on 28 June. No more details were provided on the incident or on the conditions of the man’s release.

- A video, allegedly produced on 21 June, was published on social media in late June showing four Nigerian aid workers who were kidnapped along with their driver in Borno, Nigeria. The four hostages identified themselves as employees of aid groups Action Against Hunger (ACF), International Rescue Committee (IRC) and REACH: and appealed to their respective organisations and the Nigerian government to rescue them. While the hostages did not name their captors, they referred to them as “soldiers of the khalifa”, which in previous instances has been used to denote the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The captors’ demands were not mentioned either. However, some sources allege the insurgents demanded USD 500,000 for the release of the hostages. The aid workers were confirmed dead, killed by their captors, on 22 July.

- A local community health worker was rescued by police in Enugu following reports from local residents. The victim was found critically ill at the time of her rescue. The 40-year-old accountant arrived in Nigeria on 22 November 2019 to meet a man she had befriended on Facebook three years ago. The woman’s visit was supposed to last for ten days, but the man did not allow her to return and held her against her will. According to police investigations, the suspect deliberately lured the victim into the country with the aim of confining and sexually abusing her, as well as to extort money from her.

In Libya, despite negotiations between the warring parties in the conflict opening as a result of the Berlin Conference on Libya in January, the security situation has continued to deteriorate. This has been exacerbated by both sides continuing to receive outside support, including the deployment of mercenaries, further protracting the war. The security vacuum has been a fertile ground for a myriad of hostile actors, including well-organised criminal gangs, which operate virtually unimpeded or at times in concert with local forces. Despite the poor security situation in the country, Libya continues to be a receptor of foreign illegal migration, due to the existing job opportunities in the oil sector, as well as being an exit point towards Europe. According to NGO Doctors for Human Rights (MEDU), around 85% of migrants and refugees are subjected to torture and other violence in Libya, with two-thirds reporting having been detained against their will, either for ransom or forced labour. Kidnappers use extreme tactics to make sure the ransom money is paid, including sending torture videos to victims’ families via social media. Generally, ransom amounts seem to range between USD 2,000 and 3,000, but sums as high as USD 60,000 have also been recorded. According to some studies, Eritreans, Somalis and Ethiopians are the most common victims, though it is unclear whether they are being specifically targeted due to their nationality or as a result of the route they follow. Having said that, it is believed they may be considered more attractive targets for kidnapping gangs, given their large diaspora in developed countries and their strong sense of community, which translates into larger and better mobilisation of funds.

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Over May-June 2020, Asia saw a slight increase in the number of kidnapping incidents targeting foreign nationals. This is probably connected to the relaxation of COVID-19 restrictions across the region, allowing criminal groups to slowly resume operations, 77% of the incidents recorded by Constellis (the reporting period took place in Cambodia and the Philippines, being carried out by Chinese groups involved in gambling-related activities. While countries in the region are taking measures to curb some of the illegal activities of these groups, it is unlikely that major changes will take place. This is mainly due to the importance of this sector to the economy, both locally and at national level, meaning that governments are unwilling to uproot them. However, on the other hand, China is taking a tough stand on cross-border illegal gambling. In April, China’s Ministry of Public Security issued a campaign ‘Strictly Combating Cross-Border Gambling and Telecommunications Network Fraud’. The authorities said this followed a detected increase in activities from online gambling operators based outside the country, targeting Chinese citizens during the pandemic, thus forcing the Ministry of Foreign Security to take measures to safeguard China’s economic and social order. Among measures included in the programme were the creation of a blacklist system for Chinese citizens participating in gambling as well as those working in these activities overseas, strengthening methods of detection, blocking payment processing, and most recently, the establishment of a whistle-blower platform, offering rewards to those reporting such activities.

**CASES:**

- **Philippine anti-kidnapping police arrested an Indonesian national suspected of the kidnapping of a female foreign employee of a Philippine Offshore Gaming Operator (POGO) in Makati City. The arrest took place following the escape of the Chinese victim from a safe house located in Tagaytay City, on 20 June. In her report to the police, the woman declared she had been called to a meeting by the suspect on 16 June. Once at the indicated location, she was forced by the man and his accomplices – a Filipino and three Chinese nationals – into a van and taken to Tagaytay City. The kidnappers called the woman’s relatives in China to demand CNY 1 million (USD 141,000) in exchange for her release. The authorities said that the operation resulting in the arrest of the Indonesian suspect had also been aimed at rescuing a second victim, for whom the group demanded CNY 450,000 (USD 64,000) in ransom. However, the second victim was not found at the location. It is unclear if both victims had been captured together or separately. Investigations continue to find the remaining hostage and suspects.**

- **In Cambodia, Preah Sihanouk police arrested four Chinese men accused of kidnapping a compatriot for a USD 70,000 ransom. The incident took place on 5 June, when the suspects abducted Chinese businessman Wang Wen Xing from a restaurant in Sihanoukville’s Buon commune. The businessman was held at a rental house in Sihanouvike’s Buon commune, where he was assaulted and forced to call his wife in China and demand the ransom. The wife contacted a family friend living in Sihanoukville, who alerted the Cambodian authorities. Police raided the criminals’ hideout on 7 June, rescuing the victim and arresting two suspects. The two other suspects were arrested in a subsequent operation.**

- **On 22 June, an Afghan Sikh was kidnapped from the Thala Sri Guru Nanak Sahib Gurdwara in Tsamkani district of Paktia province, while he was completing service at the temple. No group claimed the abduction; however, Afghan authorities blamed the incident on the Taliban. These claims were allegedly supported by reports that relatives of the victim in India had received phone calls from Afghanistan by people claiming to belong to the Taliban. In a statement on 25 June, the militant group denied any involvement in the kidnapping, pledging to bring those responsible to Taliban justice and ensuring their commitment to “minority rights”. Nidan Singh was released on 18 July, allegedly following efforts by the Afghan government and community elders. The identity of the perpetrators remains unclear, with Singh’s family stating after the release that they believed he was abducted by a local mafia.**

- **In another show of increasing tension between India and Pakistan, on 16 June, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) summoned the Charge d’Affaires of Pakistan’s High Commission, Haider Shah, over the “abduction and torture” of two Indian officials in Pakistan. According to India’s MEA, on 15 June, two Indian High Commission Officials were abducted by Pakistani intelligence agents in Islamabad, where they were kept in illegal custody and abused for more than ten hours. The officials were also reportedly videotaped and coerced to accept a series of fictitious allegations and concocted charges. Additionally, the vehicle of the High Commission, in which the victims were travelling, was extensively damaged. The Pakistan Foreign Ministry rejected all allegations, saying that the Indian officials had been lawfully detained after a hit-and-run incident that left one person injured.**

In Afghanistan, ethnic minorities have been frequent targets of violence by militant groups. More recently, the Sikh community has been the object of a series of attacks, which have included shootings, bombnings and kidnappings. On 25 March, three gunmen stormed the Guru Har Rai Gurdwara (Sikh temple) in Kabul, killing at least 25 Sikhs and injuring 15 others, including Indian citizens. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP), which is IS’s branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan, claimed responsibility for the attack soon afterwards. This was followed the next day by the detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) at the funeral of those who lost their lives in the shooting attack. While Sikhs have been targeted by Afghan militants and past, these were the biggest attacks on the minority group in recent years. As such, it mobilised the community to knock on doors at the highest levels of the Indian government and raise the alarm for the protection of the community in Afghanistan. This soon translated into calls to invoke the newly-established Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), as well as the Vande Bharat Mission (India’s repatriation programme created to bring home Indian nationals stranded in foreign countries due to the COVID-19 outbreak), to provide evacuation and asylum in India for its members. As the focus on the issue started to dwindle, a member of the community was kidnapped in Paktia province in June, reigniting fears among the Sikhs in Afghanistan and calls for action from India.
Statistics for May–June 2020 are drawn from Constellis’ record of 168 kidnapped foreign nationals. Over March–April 2020, Constellis recorded a total of 139 foreign nationals kidnapped across the world.

**Top 10 Countries for the Kidnapping of Foreign Citizens in May–Jun 2020**

- **Libya** (64) 38.1%
- **Benin** (24) 14.3%
- **Lebanon** (23) 13.7%
- **Mozambique** (3) 1.8%
- **Equatorial Guinea** (4) 2.4%
- **Philippines** (6) 3.6%
- **Gabon** (6) 3.6%
- **Nigeria** (7) 4.2%
- **Trinidad & Tobago** (8) 4.7%
- **Mexico** (8) 4.7%

**Regional Geographical Distribution of Victims**

- **Africa** 65%
- **Middle East** 15%
- **Americas** 12%
- **Asia** 7%
- **Europe** 1%

**Rest of the World** (15) 8.9%

* Including Migrants

(Number of Victims)
MAY-JUN 2020

REGIONAL ORIGINS OF VICTIMS

01 SOUTH ASIAN (31) 18.5%
02 SOUTHEAST ASIAN (28) 16.7%
03 MIDDLE EASTERN (25) 14.9%
04 NORTH AFRICAN (23) 13.7%
05 AFRICAN (20) 11.9%
06 UNKNOWN (17) 10.1%
07 LATIN AMERICAN (18) 9.5%
08 EUROPEAN (7 4.1%
09 NORTH AMERICAN (1) 0.6%

MOST VICTIMIZED SINGLE NATIONALITY

01 Bangladeshi 06 Venezuelan
02 Egyptian 07 Ghanaian
03 Syrian 08 Indian
04 Unknown 09 South Korean
05 Chinese 10 Haitian

VICTIMS BY SECTOR

MIGRANTS (75) 44.6%
MARITIME (34) 20.2%
UNSKILLED (24) 14.3%
OTHER (19) 6%
UNKNOWN (8) 5.3%
DIPLOMAT (2) 1.2%
MINING (2) 1.2%
NGO (1) 0.6%
PROFESSIONALS (1) 0.6%

DISCLAIMER: These statistics herein presented are the result of a compilation of kidnapping incidents involving foreign nationals only, which have been reported in the media and other open sources. The information contained and its results are therefore partial result of the incomplete nature of open-source material. Thus, this report should be taken only as a reference of general trends, taking its limitations into consideration.

REGION ORIGIN
Africa South Asias
Americas Latin Americans
Asia Southeast Asians
Europe Latin Americans
Middle East Middle Easterns

REGION OCCUPATIONAL SECTOR
Africa Migrants
Americas Migrants
Asia Other
Europe Unknown
Middle East Migrants
STATISTICS  JUL 2019 - JUN 2020

Regional GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION of VICTIMS

AFRICA 38.7%  MIDDLE EAST 20.4%  ASIA 19.8%  AMERICAS 15%  EUROPE 6.1%

AFRICA

Libya* (111) ..... 24.1%
Nigeria (111) ..... 24.1%
Benin (51) ...... 11.1%
Cameroon (26) ..... 5.4%
Topo (24) ........ 5.2%
Gabon (20) ...... 4.4%
Guinea (20) ...... 4.4%
Chad (17) ..... 3.7%
South Africa* (12) ..... 2.6%
DRC (10) ........ 2.2%
Others* (59) ... 12.8%

MIDDLE EAST

Iran (142) ........ 58.7%
Lebanon (34) ..... 14.1%
Yemen (18) ..... 7.4%
Syria* (14) ..... 5.6%
Iraq (11) ........ 4.6%
Turkey (7) ..... 2.9%
Kuwait (6) ..... 2.5%
Lebanon (3) ..... 1.2%
Saudi Arabia (3) ..... 1.2%
Israel (2) ..... 0.8%
UAE (2) ........ 0.8%

ASIA

Philippines (76) 32.3%
Cambodia (44) ..... 18.7%
China (X) ..... 12.6%
Pakistan* (29) ..... 12.1%
North Korea (17) ..... 7.2%
Malaysia* (15) ..... 6.4%
India (6) ........ 2.6%
Myanmar (6) ..... 2.6%
Afghanistan (3) ..... 1.3%
Indonesia (2) ..... 0.9%
Others (7) ....... 2.9%

AMERICAS

Mexico* (102) ..... 57.4%
Colombia (11) ..... 6.2%
Trinidad & Tobago (10) ..... 5.6%
Venezuela (10) ..... 5.6%
Haiti (8) ........ 4.5%
US* (8) ........ 4.5%
Honduras (4) ..... 2.2%
Paraguay (4) ..... 2.2%
Uruguay (4) ..... 2.2%
Ecuador (3) ..... 1.7%
Others (14) ...... 7.9%

EUROPE

Greece* (35) ...... 48.6%
North Macedonia* (12) ..... 16.6%
Russia (6) ....... 8.3%
Spain (6) ..... 8.3%
Ireland (3) ...... 4.2%
Netherlands (2) ..... 2.8%
UK (2) ........ 2.8%
Italy (1) ...... 1.4%
Portugal (1) ...... 1.4%
Sweden (1) ..... 1.4%
Others (3) ...... 2.9%

(Number of Victims)

* Including Migrants

Statistics for July 2019 - June 2020 are drawn from Constellis’ record of 1,187 foreign nationals kidnapped worldwide.

STATISTICS

REGION NUMBER OF VICTIMS
AFRICA 460
MIDDLE EAST 242
ASIA 235
AMERICAS 178
EUROPE 72

6.1% EUROPE
15% AMERICAS
19.8% ASIA

REGION
AFRICA
MIDDLE EAST
ASIA
AMERICAS
EUROPE

NUMBER OF VICTIMS
460
242
235
178
72

STATISTICS

JUL 2019 - JUN 2020

Top 10 COUNTRIES FOR THE KIDNAPPING OF FOREIGN CITIZENS IN JUL 2019 - JUN 2020

LIBYA* (111) 9.4%
NIGERIA (111) 9.4%
MEXICO* (102) 8.6%
PHILIPPINES (76) 6.4%
BENIN (51) 4.3%
CAMEROON (25) 2.1%
PAKISTAN* (29) 2.4%
CHINA (30) 2.5%
GREECE* (35) 2.9%
CAMBODIA (44) 3.7%

REST OF THE WORLD (573) 48.3%

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### CASES:

- **On 17 May**, UK-flagged product tanker STOLT APAL was attacked in the GOA, westbound in the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), some 75 nautical miles (nm) off Mukala, Yemen. According to a spokesman for the vessel’s management company, Stolt Tankers, the tanker was approached by two speedboats carrying around six armed pirates. Multiple warning shots were fired by the embarked armed guard team, with the skiffs opening fire on the ship. The armed guard team then returned fire, disabling one skiff and ending the pursuit. The attack reportedly involved three vessels, one of them used to distract the security vessel.

- **Statoil Tankers**, the tanker was approached by two speedboats carrying around six armed pirates. Multiple warning shots were fired by the embarked armed guard team, with the skiffs opening fire on the ship. The armed guard team then returned fire, disabling one skiff and ending the pursuit. The attack reportedly involved three vessels, one of them used to distract the security vessel.

- **Singapore-flagged FPSO SENDJE BERGE**, which was spread-moored at the Okwori field, was attacked by unknown gunmen 30nm SW of Bonny Island in the early hours of 2 July. The attack reportedly involved three vessels, one of them used to distract the security vessel.

### HOSTILE ACTIVITY UPDATE

**During May and June 2020** Constellis recorded 63 maritime crime incidents, an increase of 11% from the 58 events recorded over the previous two months. As expected, the COVID-19 crisis had a negative impact upon maritime security, resulting in an increase in crime in a number of regions in the world. This is highly likely to worsen in the coming months as the economic crisis unfolds, pushing more individuals into crime. In accordance with established trends, criminal板ardings, particularly those involving low-level crime, accounted for the majority (66%) of recorded incidents. There were six successful kidnaps, in addition to a series of boardings and suspicious approaches, which were probably attempted kidnaps.

The situation in the Gulf of Mexico remains precarious, with the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) issuing a new alert on 11 May, once again warning about threats in the Southern Gulf of Mexico, particularly in the Bay of Campeche area, where a number of violent armed attacks and hostage-takings have been recorded in recent months. This was followed by a warning issued by the US Department of State on 17 June. It is assessed that the Mexican government’s focus on fighting the drug cartels, in addition to corruption, has allowed maritime gangs to flourish. These groups typically target vessels and offshore platforms associated with the oil industry. They operate mostly at night, with five to 15 men on several speedboats, disguised as local fishermen or members of the security forces, and carrying weapons ranging from knives to assault rifles. A number of bodies have also issued warnings regarding the volatility of the security situation in Libya. In particular, Turkish ships and crews have been warned against calling at Libya’s Eastern ports controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA), following threats issued by the group in connection with Turkey’s support for the Government of National Accord (GNA). Of additional concern is the substantial military activity noted in the Mediterranean Sea, following Turkey’s declaration on 21 July of its intention to begin seismic surveys off the coast of the Greek island of Kastelorizo. This situation marks a new escalation in the conflict, which could easily lead to maritime armed conflict.

Hostile activity in the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and the wider East Africa region continues to decrease, with only two incidents recorded over May and June. In contrast with April and May, when all recorded events were suspicious approaches, or this reporting period one vessel was fired upon and the other experienced an attempted boarding. This demonstrates that despite the decreasing numbers, hostile actors in the region retain their intent and capacity to attack. Notable over the reporting period have been developments on the Yemeni island of Socotra, where militants of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) took control of the island. While this is unlikely to directly affect maritime traffic in the area, it adds to instability in the region. For instance, following the takeover, a fleet of what seemed to be Iranian fishing boats illegally entered Socotra’s territorial waters. Though the intention of the vessels was unclear, the event demonstrates that elements with a variety of motivations may attempt to take advantage of the lack of control in the area.

The Gulf of Guinea (GOG) maintained similar incident levels to the previous reporting period, with 21 incidents recorded over May and June. The number of kidnappings equaled the number of criminal boardings (5), of which two were believed to have been aimed at kidnapping crew. Remarkably, there were four hijackings, compared to none during March and April. This would seem consistent with notions asserting that GOG pirates may be making use of motherships to carry out kidnappings further offshore. Additionally, in a new methodology observed in early July off Nigeria, pirates may also be using hijacked vessels as decoys to distract onboard security, while faster boats carry out the actual boarding. The use of explosives during attacks is also an emerging concern. Indeed, piracy in the GOG is evolving rapidly, with the region showing itself to be the most dangerous for the maritime sector, especially for crew.

While trends of hostile maritime activity in Southeast Asia remained largely unchanged, incident rates continue to grow. With a 33% increase recorded over the reporting period, 2020 has so far seen a doubling in the number of recorded cases with respect to 2019, accounting also for the highest peak since 2016. Activity in the region remains largely low-level, with most incidents attached to SENDJE BERGE while the remaining two approached the FPSO. 11 crewmembers, all Nigerian nationals, were reported kidnapped in the attack. Reports indicate that explosives were used during the attack, leading to speculation it could have been perpetrated by Niger Delta militants, who on 1 July withdrew from the ceasefire agreed with the Nigerian government.

In late June, Indonesian sources reported that an Indonesian boy had escaped his Abu Sayyaf captors. The teenager was part of a group of five Indonesian fishermen who were kidnapped in waters off Tambisan Island in Lahad Datu, Malaysia, in January 2020. The current whereabouts of the boy and the circumstances of his alleged escape are unknown. It was also reported that the remaining Indonesian hostages are currently being held by Abu Sayyaf in Sulu, who have demanded PHP 30 million (over USD 607,000) for their release.
With China coming under increasing scrutiny on the international stage over a number of issues, many fear the threat of imminent Chinese cyber retaliation. Indeed, a number of suspected state-sponsored cyberattacks have already been traced to China, evidence of a regime seeking to strike back at what it regards as challenges to its global aspirations. These attacks appear to have spared no sector, threatening governments, businesses and critical infrastructure alike; including essential health services. With the UK, US, India, Australia, and a number of other nations caught up in diplomatic rows with the eastern superpower, an elevated risk of Chinese-backed malicious cyber activity is thought to be inevitable.

Relations between China and the ‘West’ have recently become increasingly strained due to a variety of developments. Chief amongst these are criticisms over how the country allegedly covered up the COVID-19 outbreak. These suspicions led a coalition of 62 nations, spearheaded by Australia, to call for an independent enquiry into the origins of the virus. On top of this comes the widespread condemnation of China’s recent introduction of the National Security Law in Hong Kong, as well as other issues such as the reignition of border disputes between China and India; and China’s naval activities in the South China Sea.

With growing suspicion concerning China’s political-economic ambitions, a number of states have taken preventative action to curb growing Chinese influence, disinformation and interference. Of note has been the UK’s recent turnaround regarding telecom company Huawei and its involvement in the country’s 5G network. Huawei has supplied masts and other telecommunications equipment to the UK as part of this country’s deployment of 5G infrastructure. However, amid growing diplomatic enmity, the UK government has now ruled that no telecom networks will be allowed to purchase Huawei 5G kits, and that previous installations should be removed by 2027. This decision also comes following allegations that Huawei poses a risk to national security, and should not have any access to vulnerable and sensitive parts of the UK network; mainly due to fears of Chinese espionage. Likewise, the US designated Huawei and another Chinese mobile network component supplier, ZTE, as threats to national security, claiming they have links to the Chinese military. In a similar move to the UK, the US is introducing regulations to ban the government from working with any contractors using Chinese telecommunications equipment and services. India has meanwhile banned 59 apps of Chinese origin, including TikTok and ShareIt, following reports they were stealing and mining users’ data, and transmitting it outside the country.

While intended to block surreptitious Chinese activity, such actions will also likely provoke increased Chinese retaliation, as already seen in Australia in mid-June. Fearing analogous mass cyber operations, India has begun to bolster security around its power grid. Such attacks could also have the potential to bring down computer networks and heavily disrupt the business sector. Though a ‘cyber 9/11’ scenario is not anticipated, Chinese cyberattacks could still have significant socio-economic consequences, impacting both private and government organisations alike.

**CASES:**

- Indian authorities stated that suspected China-based hackers conducted over 40,000 attacks against India’s IT infrastructure and banking sector over a five-day period in late June 2020. These included distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) and phishing attacks, which were alleged to have emanated from China’s Chengdu area. The attacks came amid increased hostilities between the two countries over a border dispute.

- In mid-June 2020, Australia announced that it was under a sustained and large-scale cyberattack campaign, which due to its sophistication was highly likely being conducted by a nation state. The attacks, believed to be the work of Chinese hackers, targeted all levels of government and most economic sectors. Other attacks also targeted hospitals and other state utilities.

While such attacks are not new, they are reportedly the most significant and coordinated ever observed by Australian authorities. This uptick in malicious cyber activity, on the rise since diplomatic relations with China fractured, prompted the Australian government to issue a warning to businesses and organisations. Though the current wave of cyberattacks is not thought to have resulted in any mass data breaches, the hackers have been adept at reconnoitering networks for vulnerabilities, and also engaging in spearphishing techniques, such as sending malicious emails with links to credential-harvesting websites.

- In late April 2020, the EU reported increased ‘malicious cyber activities’ against the healthcare sector of member states. These included malware and phishing campaigns, as well as DDoS attacks. Authorities in the Czech Republic, for instance, reported large-scale attacks against hospitals, exposing critical communications and systems data. Though not confirmed, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen indicated that China may have been behind these attacks during the coronavirus crisis.
Plagued by a decade of insecurity and lawlessness, there are signs of increasing political stability in Somalia as the country transitions into a parliamentary republic. In 2020, for the first time in 50 years, Somalia will conduct a one-person-one-vote election. After Somalia’s civil war, 2012 gave the first sign of hope in decades that a unified Somalia could exist peacefully. Clan elders approved a provisional constitution, appointed a 275-strong parliament, and elected their first president since 1967, giving birth to the Federal Republic of Somalia. However, this year, Somalia has before it a confluence of internal and external events that could shape its future for the next several decades. For a country on the constant edge of crisis as a result of armed conflict, drought, flooding, famine, poor governance, and limited infrastructure, the next six months will have a significant impact on its trajectory towards continued stabilisation.

Since a United Nations (UN) mandate was established in 2007 following the civil war, Somalia has benefited from stability efforts, counter-terrorism measures and training for its security forces, provided by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Initially chartered for six months with a force of 2,000 troops, AMISOM’s mandate has been under constant extension and growth, with forces reaching 22,000 in 2019 at a cost of well over €1 billion. With the Somali National Army (SNA) failing to meet many of their transition benchmarks, in addition to waning popular support in AMISOM member countries and a pay scale reduction for AMISOM troops, renewals of the AMISOM mandate have been tenuous. Subsequently, in late 2019, troop drawdowns were initiated. After concerted debate and realignment of benchmarks, the UN mandate for AMISOM was renewed on 31 May 2020, maintaining a force of 19,600+ AMISOM soldiers to carry Somalia through the 2020/2021 election cycle.

While peaceful governmental transition and the renewal of the AMISOM mandate represent positive developments for the country, Somalia nevertheless continues to struggle with complex security issues. Clan discrimination and rivalries continue to erode unity and strain governance, particularly in Somalia’s widespread and ethnically diverse states and regions. While infrastructure, resources and aid are easier to come by in urban centres like Mogadishu and Baidoa, rural swaths of the country see scant benefit from a centralised government, promoting the creation of divisions.

Further compounding such issues, Somalia continues to experience severe levels of jihadist insurgency. In the midst of this fledgling democracy, al-Shabab, a fundamentalist Islamic terrorist group, severely threatens stability. AMISOM has fought to keep the insurgent group at bay, though territorial gains are easily lost. With dwindling patronage and fewer resources, al-Shabab now concentrates efforts on larger-scale, more devastating attacks that target government entities, business centres and individuals promoting the election process. Compounding terrorism threat levels, the Islamic State (IS) has made inroads in Somalia, with the group’s local affiliate based in Puntland. IS, though significantly less influential than its rival, has demonstrated its ability to carry out attacks in Mogadishu and Bossaso. Kidnappings, bombings, murder, illegal roadblocks, banditry, indirect fire attacks and other violent incidents can occur in any region of Somalia.

Piracy has historically been a major security challenge in Somalia. However, from 2012 onwards, overall numbers of successful hijackings and other maritime security incidents have fallen considerably. The steady decline was attributed to international naval efforts, piracy countermeasures on board ships, and a relative improvement in governance and security conditions in Somalia. However, activity in the Horn of Africa saw an uptick at the start of 2020 after a nearly decade-long decline since its peak. Further stabilisation, or its lack, will determine whether this uptick in maritime piracy attempts proves to be a blip on the radar or the beginning of a new cycle.

Governance and security will influence only some of the events unfolding in 2020. Somalia is a country at high risk of natural hazards. The past two years experienced favourable climate conditions for the rapid breeding of the locust population, leading to the worst outbreak in 25 years. As a result, in early 2020, the Somali government declared a state of emergency due to desert locust infestations, which significantly threaten Somalia’s food security. Exacerbating this issue are the recurrent droughts and subsequent famine. Additionally, recent floods in April and May of this year have affected at least 700,000 Somalis and displaced 263,000 others from their homes. Forced evacuations have squeezed populations into crowded temporary housing, increasing concerns of COVID-19 contagion at the height of the pandemic.

COVID-19 also presents a complex issue for the Somali nation. Somalia’s fragile healthcare system, basic at best, even in urban population centres, is often overwhelmed by infectious disease cycles of cholera, tuberculosis, typhoid fever, and hepatitis A. In this context, Somalia is home to some of the worst health indicators in the world. The few clinics and hospitals available in rural central and southern Somalia are already unable to support the number of patients needing treatment on any given day. Additionally, with poor sanitation, dense population centres, and a lack of resources for self-isolation and quarantine, Somalia currently has the highest COVID-19 death toll in East Africa. A late entrant to the global viral spread, if COVID-19 takes hold in Somalia’s already vulnerable population, the outcome could prove disastrous.

COVID-19 affects Somalia from a distance as well. The $1.4 billion a year in remittances to pay for food, clean water, education and business opportunities. Without the vital source of income that remittances provide, where will the population turn?

A rare bright spot showed on Somalia’s horizon when in February of this year the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank announced that Somalia is now eligible for assistance under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Through a series of economic and financial reforms instituted by the Somali government and documented by the IMF under the IMF Staff Monitored Program, Somalia now has a path toward debt forgiveness, a debt which totalled $5.3 billion in 2018. With the ability to receive debt relief, loans, grants and a myriad of policy resources, this could prove a turning point for Somalia. Furthermore, Somalia’s oil and gas sector is currently in the process of developing and expanding. This is thanks to improvements in the country’s stability and security in recent years, which has facilitated efforts to resume exploration.

Overall, however, Somalia’s economic situation is currently precarious, with growth rates falling and inflation elevated. The economic damage caused by recent disasters will significantly impact the local populace and poverty rates, while international investment may be affected as a result of general global economic malaise in 2020. As the next six months unfold, Somalia’s future hangs in the balance. The stabilisation of Somalia and security in the Horn of Africa depend on many factors, but the continued resilience of the Somali people will be the most important factor in determining the outcome.
ABOUT CONSTELLIS

Constellis is a leading provider of risk management, humanitarian, social intelligence, training and operational support services to government and commercial clients throughout the world. Operating in over 45 countries, Constellis’ 20,000 employees bring unparalleled dedication and passion for creating a safer world by upholding the highest standards of compliance, quality, and integrity. Constellis’ forward-thinking services span a broad range of synergistic solutions, from the boardroom to the project site, encompassing risk governance, organisational resilience, business continuity management, crisis management, travel security, global tracking, training, protective security, life support, logistics and specialist support such as K9 services and UAV systems.

At Constellis, our number one mission is to secure success for our customers. Constellis combines the legacy capabilities and experience of ACADEMI, Triple Canopy, Centerra, Olive Group, OmniPlex, AMK9, Edinburgh International, Strategic Social and all of their affiliates. The consolidation of companies under the Constellis name allows our clients to rely on one single partner and project experience that spans the globe.

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Constellis’ intelligence analysts and security consultants produce bespoke political and security reports, threat assessments and security risk assessments to inform decisions and to protect people and assets across the world.